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THE

GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 52

Fall 1963

NUMBER I

THE CURRENT CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM:
THE CONFEDERATING PROPOSALS
WnLIAm F. SWILER*

Professor Swindler treats the three recently proposed constitutional amendments as the culmination of state frustration at the evolution of ascendant federalism especially as embodied in modern Supreme Court decisions. Equating
the proposals, in effect, to the fragmented system under the Articles of Confederation, he rejects them as contrary to the weight of constitutional history. The
Constitution having established a new concept of federalism-an amalgam of the
people of the United States-the author concludes that representative government is the essence of that federalism and that neither the states, their legislatures,
nor their courts can have authority in the area of activity which the people of the
United States have established as their exclusive domain.
INTRODUCTION:

GENESIS OF THE NEW ANTI-FEDERALISM

Almost a decade has passed since Brown v. Board of Educ. touched
off a Babel of debate which has been as acrimonious as it has been prolonged. Aside from, even though inseparable from, the question of racial
segregation in public schools has been the issue of state versus federal
jurisdiction over certain subject-areas. When, upon hearing further arguments on its order in the first ruling in the Brown case, the Supreme
Court unequivocally reaffirmed "the fundamental principle that racial
discrimination in public education is unconstitutional," it added categorically that "all provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle."' The Louisiana
legislature was the first of many to react to this holding; it memorialized
Congress with the declaration that such a question "is a matter of legisla* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary;
Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia; author of forthcoming book on twentiethcentury history of the Constitution of the United States.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
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tive policy for the several states, with which the federal courts are powerless
to interfere."'3 This has been the premise-or the ultimate issue, as the
case might be-over which a long judicial struggle has been carried on
in the ensuing nine years.4
The segregation cases, in their variants, have thus served to exacerbate
a constitutional issue which is itself "separate but equal" in importance
to the social question represented in the cases themselves. And the cases
have developed at a significant point in time with respect to this issue;
Brown, it should be remembered, came on the heels of the flurry of litigation and legislation involving the question of state versus federal control
over tideland oil deposits, 5 and eight years before Baker v. Carr.' A traceable chronology of disputes over states and federalism, in terms of midcentury problems and politics, can in fact be extended back to 1937 when
7 signaled
a series of decisions typified by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
an historic shift in constitutional jurisprudence where broad construction
was equated with ascendant federalism.'
Ironically enough, Parrish established (by a five-to-four margin) a
state power to establish minimum wages for women; its significance lay
in the fact that it was to usher in a rapid succession of cases in which the
paramountcy of the federal power, based upon the welfare and commerce
clauses9 of the Constitution, was to be ever more positively declared. The
states' power to enact social security legislation was upheldl°--but it
3 Senator Ellender of Louisiana presented the concurrent resolution of the state legislature to Congress on June 15, 1954. 100 Cong. Rec. 8199 (1954). See generally the
detailed statistical review accompanying the statement of Senator Daniel of Texas. 100
Cong. Rec. 6742-46 (1954). The memorial of the California legislature supporting the
Supreme Court holding appears in 102 Cong. Rec. 5116 (1956). Legislative criticisms of
the holding from Georgia, Virginia, South Carolina and Mississippi appear, respectively,
in 102 Cong. Rec. 1512, 2020, 3519 and 4444 (1956).
4 The most comprehensive documentary record of this struggle appears in the collective
volumes of the Race Relations Law Reporter, established at Vanderbilt University School
of Law in 1956 under a grant from the Fund for the Republic.
5 See cases cited note 19 infra.

6 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7 300 U.S. 379 ,(1937).
8 Representative of the torrent of commentary having some pertinence to the present
debate are: Alfange, Supreme Court and the National Will (1937); Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd. (1941); Swisher, Supreme Court in Transition, 1 J. Politics
349 (1939).
9 For the most comprehensive annotation of the clauses in article I, section 8,
see Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation 112-253
(Corwin ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as Corwin].
10 Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
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paled in comparison with the seven-to-two opinion affirming the greater
federal power over this particular subject matter." Meanwhile, the expansion of federal jurisdiction advanced steadily in other fields as Chief
Justice Hughes undertook the remarkable administrative task of preserving a consistency and unity in jurisprudence-his tenure having inherited
the remnants of laissez-faire and being destined to end in a blaze of federalism. 12 After 1937 the Court consistently found favorable constitutional grounds for national jurisdiction 3 in the fields of labor relations, 4
business'15 and agriculture. 1 6 And each step along the way was disputed
by various groups with various arguments 7 at first espoused by only a
minority but continually waxing and waning in volume and effect.
Political straws in the wind following World War II pointed toward a
mounting legislative antipathy respecting the continued expansion of
federal jurisdiction. The new policy direction in labor law, exemplified
in the Taft-Hartley Act,' 8 doubtless encouraged a move to dispute the
paramount interest of the national government in an economic area of
major concern to a small but powerful group of states-the area relating
to tideland oil deposits. The judicial position was firmly in favor of federal jurisdiction over the underwater preserves extending from the lowtide mark to the three-mile limit; in three suits involving California,
Louisiana and Texas,' 9 the Supreme Court uniformly found for the
11 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); see Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
12 See 2 Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes 683-748 (1951).
18 On this significant area of constitutional development, the most objective and concise
discussion appears in Swisher, American Constitutional Development, ch. 37 (2d ed. 1954).
14 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
15 Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
16 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939).
17 See authorities cited note 8 supra. In addition, the following works contain relevant
commentary: Corwin, Court Over Constitution (1950); Jackson, Struggle for Judicial
Supremacy (1941); Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court (1948).
18 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C §§ 14187 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). Note the language
of section 1:
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their
relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing
the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights
of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities
affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect
the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
19 United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S.
699 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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United States, with Mr. Justice Black observing that "the state is not
equipped in our constitutional system with the powers or the facilities
for exercising the responsibilities which would be concomitant with the
dominion it seeks."2 Congress, however, heeded the pleas for "the returning of the tidelands to their rightful owners, the states," 2 ' and in 1953
renounced the federal government's rights in favor of state claims to the
preserves.22
On the whole, however, state efforts to resist the growing assertiveness
of federal jurisdiction have been substantially frustrated. The reaction
to the Brown decision took the form of a brief but vigorous effort to
revive the constitutional doctrine of interposition 2 -- which was summarily
20 United States v. California, supra note 19, at 35-36.
99 Cong. Rec. A378 (1953) (remarks of Representative Bentsen).
22 Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29 (1953), as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1958).
23 Interposition, as originally conceived, was based upon the theory that the Constitution
derived its powers from the people of the individual states instead of an amalgam of
the people of the United States. The doctrine meant that by having originally granted
powers to the federal government, the states assumed the "duty, to watch over and
oppose every infraction of those principles, which constitute the only basis of Union."
(Virginia Resolution) Interposition vs. Judicial Power, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 471 (1956).
At its inception, the doctrine rested primarily on the fact that the states could attempt
to amend the Constitution and thus overrule the expanding use of federal power; this
was a constitutional basis since such state power was inherent in the amending process and
was effectuated by the adoption of the eleventh and fourteenth amendments.
But as the federal courts became the primary arbiters of the rights between the federal
government and the states, the doctrine of interposition was based more upon state
opposition to Supreme Court decisions affecting what a particular state thought to be
within its exclusive concern. The original vitality of this aspect of the doctrine has been
emasculated because of the realistic acceptance of the binding precedent of United States v.
Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809), where Chief Justice Marshall declared that "if
the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of
the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution
itself becomes a solemn mockery." Id. at 136.
Today the doctrine of interposition has been sophisticated to the point that the claiming
states now feel that they "may suspend the binding effect of federal law until such
time as there has been submitted to the states, and ratified, a constitutional amendment
giving the power against which the state has interposed its sovereignty." 1 Race Re. L. Rep.
466 (1956).
For the documentary history of the modern interposition effort in eight southern states,
see 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 252 (Virginia), 435 (Georgia), 437 (Alabama), 438 (Georgia),
440 (Mississippi), 443 (South Carolina), 445 (Virginia), 462 (Virginia) (1956); 2 Race
Rel. L. Rep. 228 (Tennessee), 480 (Mississippi), 481 (Tennessee), 707 (Florida), 853
(Virginia) (1957).
21
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disposed of by the Supreme Court. 4 The segregation cases, and the judicial maneuvers which developed around them, were but a small part of
the broad series of issues involving state versus federal jurisdiction, to
which state authorities after World War II addressed themselves with
increasing concern. 5 The doctrine of pre-emption of federal jurisdiction
over activities sought to be controlled by the states touched off long
comment,2 especially in cases involving jurisdiction over subversive activities,2 7 state labor relations legislation," public employment cases
where questions of political loyalty arose,29 state control over admissions
to the bar 0 and state administration of criminal law. 1
In recognition of this expanding federal power, the Conference of Chief
Justices, a coordinate agency of the Council of State Governments, in
August 1958 published the now renowned report of its Committee on
Federal-State Relations as Affected by Judicial Decisions. 2 The committee, in a detailed review of the cases in the subject-areas where federal
and state powers seemed to conflict, made a number of observations which
take on added significance in the light of subsequent actions on the part
of other coordinate agencies of the Council of State Governments. Noteworthy, for example, in contrast to the proposed establishment of a
24

Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 926 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam,

364 U.S. 500 (1960).

25 Cf. memorial to Congress on the tidelands oil issue in Resolutions of the Eighth
General Assembly of the States, 20 State Gov't 96-97 (1947), and the protests against
federal influence over interstate compacts in Resolutions Adopted by the Fifteenth General
Assembly of the States, 34 State Gov't 23 (1961).
20 See Note, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 522 (1956); Note, 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 101 (1956);
Note, 4 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 118 (1956).
27 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). The Court there held that exclusive
federal jurisdiction was established by the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 670 (1940), as amended, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2381-90 (1958), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. IV, 1963).
28 Textile Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Amalgamated Ass'n of Bus
Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
29 Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350
U.S. 551 (1956).
30 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
31 Eskridge v. Washington State Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956). For a critical discussion of the subject matter and cases referred to in notes
27-30 supra, see Report of the Conference of Chief Justices, note 32 infra.
32 Report of the Conference of Chief Justices (1958), published by the Virginia Commission of Constitutional Government (1959). The Virginia agency was established in 1958
to "develop and promulgate information concerning the dual system of government, federal
and state, established under the Constitution of the United States and those of the several
states." Va. Code Ann. § 9-48.2 (Supp. 1962).
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"Court of the Union" which is described below, is the committee's statement that
when we turn to . . . the effect of judicial decisions on federal-state relationships we come at once to the question as to where power should lie to give the
ultimate interpretation to the Constitution and to the laws made in pursuance
thereof under the authority of the United States. By necessity and by almost
universal common consent, these ultimate powers are regarded as being vested
in the Supreme Court of the United States. Any other allocation of such power
would seem to lead to chaos.33

Somewhat more cryptic, and perhaps even inconsistent, is another observation of the committee that
whether federalism shall continue to exist, and if so in what form, is primarily
a political question rather than a judicial question. On the other hand, it can
hardly be denied that judicial decisions, specifically decisions of the Supreme
Court, can give tremendous impetus to changes in the allocation of powers and
34
responsibilities as between the federal and the state governments.

In summarizing its deliberations, the committee unburdened itself in
these words:
We are now concerned specifically with the effect of judicial decisions upon
the relations between the federal government and the state governments. Here
we think that the overall tendency of decisions of the Supreme Court over the
last 25 years or more has been to press the extension of federal power and to
press it rapidly. There have been, of course, and still are, very considerable
differences within the Court on these matters, and there has been quite recently
a growing recognition of the fact . . . that the historic line which experience
seems to justify between matters primarily of national concern and matters
primarily of local concern should not be hastily or lightly obliterated. ...
We believe that in the fields with which we are concerned, and as to which we
feel entitled to speak, the Supreme Court too often has tended to adopt the
role of policy-maker without proper judicial restraint. We feel this is particularly
the case in both of the great fields we have discussed-namely, the extent and
extension of the federal power, and the supervision of state action by the Supreme
Court by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the light of the immense power
of the Supreme Court and its, practical non-reviewability in most instances no
more important obligation rests upon it, in our view, than that of careful moderation in the exercise of its policy-making role.
We find first that in constitutional cases unanimous decisions are comparative rarities and that multiple opinions, concurring or dissenting, are common
occurrences. We find next that divisions in result on a 5 to 4 basis are quite
frequent. We find further that on some occasions a majority of the Court cannot
33
34

Report of the Conference of Chief Justices, op. cit. supra note 32, at 4.
Id. at 5. (Emphasis added.)

1963]

CONFEDERATING PROPOSALS

be mustered in support of any one opinion and that the result of a given case
may come from the divergent views of individual Justices who happen to unite
on one outcome or the other of the case before the Court.
We further find that the Court does not accord finality to its own determinations of constitutional questions, or for that matter of others. We concede that
a slavish adherence to stare decisis could at times have unfortunate consequences;
but it seems strange that under a constitutional doctrine which requires all
others to recognize the Supreme Court's rulings on constitutional questions as
binding adjudications of the meaning and application of the Constitution, the
Court itself has so frequently overturned its own decisions thereon, after the
lapse of periods varying from one year to seventy-five, or even ninety-five
years....
These frequent differences and occasional overrulings of prior decisions in constitutional cases cause us grave concern as to whether individual views of the
members of the court as from time to time constituted, or a majority thereof, as
to what is wise or desirable do not unconsciously override a more dispassionate
consideration of what is or is not constitutionally warranted. We believe that the
latter is the correct approach, and we have no doubt that every member of the
Supreme Court intends to adhere to that approach, and believes that he does so.
It is our earnest hope which we respectfully express, that that great Court exercise to the full its power of judicial self-restraint by adhering firmly to its
tremendous, strictly judicial powers and by eschewing, so far as possible, the
exercise of essentially legislative powers when it is called upon to decide questions
involving the validity of state action,whether it deems such action wise or unwise.
The value of our system of federalism, and of local self-government in local
matters which it embodies, should be kept firmly in mind, as we believe it was by
those who framed our Constitution.
At times the Supreme Court manifests, or seems to manifest, an impatience
with the slow workings of our federal system. That impatience may extend to an
unwillingness to wait for Congress to make clear its intention to exercise the
powers conferred upon it under the Constitution, or the extent to which it undertakes to exercise them, and it may extend to the slow process of amending the
Constitution which that instrument provides.3 5

The committee report precipitated a round of comment,"6 as well as
demonstrated the depth of anti-federalist feeling which was generating
among state political and judicial divisions. It is in this context that the
1962 ruling in Baker (discussed in a later section of this paper) can
best be appreciated. It is aganst this background of restiveness and
resentment that the Sixteenth Biennial General Assembly of the States
was convened at Chicago in December 1962. The Assembly's action had
35 Id. at 33-37. (Emphasis added.)

86 Brown, Free Will on the Frontiers of Federalism, 58 Mfich. L. Rev. 999 (1960);
Lockhart, Response to the Conference of State Chief Justices, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 802
(1959); Thorington, The Federal Constitution and the Sovereign States, 19 Ala. L. Rev.
362 (1958).
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been anticipated by the September meeting in Phoenix, Arizona, of the
National Legislative Conference, another constituent agency of the Council of State Governments. The Phoenix meeting approved a resolution
for strengthening the states in the federal system. It concluded that the
increasing trend toward concentration of power in the national government could be stemmed by present provisions in the federal constitution.
In furtherance of its resolution to strengthen the states, it directed its
Committee on Federal-State Relations to prepare a report for consideration by the General Assembly of the States exploring a clear cut approach
to the initiation of constitutional amendments through a constitutional
convention-the dormant method of amendment in article V. The committee was also requested to explore areas in which the tenth amendment
could be strengthened. 7
At the Chicago meeting in December, the Committee on Federal-State
Relations made its requested report to the General Assembly of the States,
including the following observations:
Some federal judicial decisions involving powers of the federal and state governments carry a strong bias on the federal side, and consequently are bringing
about a strong shift toward the extension of federal powers and the restraint of
state powers. This shift tends to accelerate as each decision forms the basis and
starting point for another extension of federal domination.
A greater degree of restraint on the part of the United States Supreme Court
can do much, but experience shows that it is not likely to be sufficient. The basic
difficulty is that the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the balance between
federal and state power are final and can be changed in practice only if the
states can muster sufficient interest in Congress, backed by a three-fourths
majority of the states themselves to amend the Constitution. While the Founding
Fathers fully expected and wished the words of the Constitution to have this
degree of finality, it is impossible to believe that they envisaged such potency
for the pronouncements of nine judges appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate ....
To amend the Federal Constitution to correct specific decisions of the federal
courts on specific points is desirable, but it will not necessarily stop the continuing drift toward more complete federal domination. The present situation has
taken a long time to develop and may take a long time to remedy. Accordingly,
some more fundamental and far-reaching change in the Federal Constitution is
necessary to preserve and protect the states. 38

The committee then submitted to the Assembly three resolutions,
memorializing Congress to call a convention for the purpose of proposing
37 Problems Facing the States, 36 State Gov't 30, 32 (1963).
38 Amending the Constitution to Strengthen the States in the Federal System, 36

State Gov't 10 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
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one or all of the constitutional amendments embodied in the report. The
committee recommended that the resolutions "should be in whatever

technical form the state employs for a single resolution of both houses
of the legislature which does not require the Governor to approve or

veto." 39 The first proposed amendment concerns the amending of the
amending process itself:
Section 1. Article V of the Constitution of the United States is hereby
amended to read as follows:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several states,
shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents
and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three-fourths of the several states. Whenever applications from the Legislatures
of two-thirds of the total number of states of the United States shall contain
identical texts of an amendment to be proposed, the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall so certify, and the amendment as contained in the application shall be deemed to have been proposed,
without further action by Congress. No State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.
Section 2. This Article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified
as an amendment to the Constitution by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the
40
several states within seven years from the date of its submission.

The resolution also provided that in each case the application for a convention under article V is to have no force or effect if, by January 1, 1965,
Congress itself has proposed an identical amendment.4
Forty-five state delegations to the General Assembly voted on the
constitutional proposal quoted above, with thirty-seven in favor, four
39 Id. at 11 n.*, 12 n.*, 13 n.*; cf. the following resolution in regard to legislative
apportionment generally:
WHEREAS the General Assembly of the States has favorably acted upon a
proposal for state initiation of an amendment to the United States Constitution
which would eliminate federal judicial authority over apportionment of representation in state legislatures; and
WHEREAS it is essential that the states themselves act responsibly and effectively
in redistricting and reapportioning their legislative bodies in accordance with the
provisions of their own constitutions;
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that all States proceed as quickly as
possible to reapportion their legislatures in accordance with the provisions of their
state constitutions and in a manner which will insure an equitable basis for representation of the people of their states.
Action on Resolutions of the Sixteenth General Assembly of the States, 36 State GG.et
24 (1963).
40 Amending the Constitution, supra note 38, at 11-12. (Emphasis added.)
41 Id. at 11-12.
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opposed and four abstaining.4 2 Forty-six delegations answered the roll
call on the second and third proposals. 3
The second proposed amendment is aimed at reversing the rule in
Baker v. Carr, and was approved by the General Assembly by a vote of
twenty-six to ten, with ten abstentions. 4 The proposed amendment reads
as follows:
Section 1. No provision of this Constitution, or any amendment thereto, shall
restrict or limit any state in the apportionment of representation in its legislature.
Section 2. The judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any
suit in law or equity, or to any controversy, relating to apportionment of representation in a state legislature.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified
as an amendment to the Constitution by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the
several States within seven years from the date of its submission. 45

The final proposal, approved by an Assembly vote of twenty-one to
twenty with five abstentions, 46 is an elaborate provision for the establishment of a fifty-member court to review certain Supreme Court opinions
in cases involving state-federal relations. This extensio ad absurdum is
set out as follows:
Section 1. Upon demand of the legislatures of five states, no two of which
shall share any common boundary, made within two years after the rendition of
any judgment of the Supreme Court relating to the rights reserved to the states
or to the people by this Constitution, such judgment shall be reviewed by a
Court composed of the chief justices of the highest courts of the several states
to be known as the Court of the Union. The sole issue before the Court of the
Union shall be whether the power or jurisdiction sought to be exercised on the
part of the United States is a power granted to it under this Constitution.
Section 2. Three-fourths of the justices of the Court of the Union shall constitute a quorum, but it shall require concurrence of a majority of the entire
Court to reverse a decision of the Supreme Court. In event of incapacity of the
chief justice of the highest court of any state to sit upon the Court of the Union,
his place shall be filled by another justice of such state court, selected by
affirmative vote of a majority of its membership.
Section 3. On the first Monday of the third calendar month following the
ratification of this amendment, the chief justices of the highest courts of the
several states shall convene at the national capital, at which time the Court of
the Union shall be organized and shall adopt rules governing its procedure.
Section 4. Decisions of the Court of the Union upon matters within its
42 Id. at 12.
.43 Id. at 12-13.
44 Id. at 13.
45 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
46

Id. at 15.
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jurisdiction shall be final and shall not thereafter be overruled by any court and
may be changed only by an amendment of this Constitution.
Section S. The Congress shall make provision for the housing of the Court
of the Union and the expenses of its operation.
Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified
as an amendment to the Constitution by the Legislatures of three-fourths
of the
47
several States within seven years from the date of its submission.

The three resolutions embodying the proposed amendments were
quietly introduced in a large number of state legislative sessions in the
early months of 1963. The record of action upon them is difficult to confirm, but a tabulation published in the summer of this year showed the
following course of action :48
amendment

one house
approving

both houses
approving

total states
considering

4
8
4

18
15
5

22
23*t
9

article V
apportionment
Court of Union

* Nebraska's unicameral legislature, ignoring the Assembly recommendation to
keep the resolution from action by the Governor, adopted the resolution but saw it
vetoed by Governor Frank Morrison.
f Utah's resolution reportedly departs from the uniform language of the recommended resolution.

In February 1963, Senator J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina
introduced the article V and Court of the Union proposals as Senate Joint
Resolutions 42 and 43 .49 Representative Sydney A. Herlong of Florida
in March 1963 introduced the apportionment resolution as House Joint
Resolution 300.50 In May, the Board of Governors of the American Bar
Association at its annual meeting in Washington, acting on a recommendation of its Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, went
on record as opposing the first and third proposals. 1 The apportionment proposal was the subject of a special report of the committee to
the House of Delegates at its August meeting in Chicago. The committee headed by Representative Louis C. Wyman (R., N.H.) endorsed
the apportionment amendment by a vote of 6 to 1. But the Bar Association's Board of Governors voted 10 to 7 to urge opposition to the
47

Id. at 14.

49 A.BA.J. 635 (1963).
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
50 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
51 49 A.BA.J. 635 (1963).
48

49 88th
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committee report. Later, the House of Delegates voted 136 to 74 to
oppose the apportionment proposal. 2
Thus stands the anti-federalist movement of the mid-century, at the
end of twenty-five years of judicial and legislative activity extending
from 1937 to 1962. The importance of the issue now presented in the
three constitutional proposals is attested by the commentary which has
begun to appear both in legal and general publications.5 3 It is not so much
the intrinsic merit (or lack of merit) in the propositions themselves, as
the challenge which they present to the practical reality of federalism
itself, which requires this exhaustive assessment. For it is clear-upon
the analysis of each proposal in the present paper and the others now
being published-that the effect of one or all of the proposals, if they
should be adopted, would be to extinguish the very essence of federalism
which distinguishes the Constitution from the Articles of Confederation.
The current anti-federalism, as the historical references in the present
study will seek to show, is anachronistic in that it looks to a pre-1787
form of national union; hence, it is alien to the historic advocacy of state
sovereignty within the federal system to which this nation was committed
in 1787. It is fundamentally dangerous because it threatens to upset the
political balance of nature. And it is ironically brought into its present
focus on the centennial of the dread conflict which settled, beyond any
reasonable doubt, that the federal structure was indissoluble. The propriety, or the jurisprudential soundness, of any judicial opinions which
have helped to precipitate the present proposals, is not here in question.
The central problem is the jeopardy in which the essence of federalism
would be placed if these proposals were seriously entertained. That there
is a concerted effort now to bring about their serious entertainment
warrants the critical examination of each of the proposals in the light of
our constitutional heritage.
I
ARTICLE V-THE AMENDING PROCESS

Article V, as it presently stands, reads as follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the application of the
52 N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,'1963, p. 19, col. 1.

53 Black, Proposed Constitutional Amendments: They Would Return Us to a Confederacy, 49 A.B.AJ. 637 (1963); Black, Proposed Amendments of Article V, A Threatened
Disaster, 72 Yale LJ. 957 (1963); Shanahan, Proposed Constitutional Amendments: They
Will Strengthen Federal-State Relations, 49 A.B.A.J. 631 (1963).
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Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand
eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses
in the Ninth section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent,
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

The amending process, it can be seen, is termed in alternatives. There
are two alternative ways by which application may be made for a proposed amendment: (1) by originating directly from the Congress or (2)
by applications from state legislatures, whereafter the Congress calls
for a convention for the purpose of proposing amendments. Ratification
also comes about by alternative methods: either by conventions or legislatures of three-fourths of the states; Congress, however, makes the
crucial determination as to which alternative is to be used.
The proposed article V would abolish the convention proviso as a
method of amending the Constitution by removing both the convention
as a proposing body and the power of Congress to choose the convention
method of ratification if it so desires. Furthermore, Congress' right to
initiate amendments could be circumvented and its power as a proposing
body thus diluted whenever two-thirds of the state legislatures had
identical language in their applications to Congress.
PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE CONVENTION PROVISO

In the famed series of resolutions with which the Virginia plan of a
stronger union was introduced to the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
Edmund Randolph submitted one which proposed "that provision ought
to be made for [hereafter] amending the system now to be established,
without requiring the assent of the Natl. Legislature." 4 His fellow Virginian, George Mason, supported this resolution. It would be improper,
Mason contended, to require the consent of Congress to amendments
proposed by the states "because they may abuse their power, and refuse
their consent on that very account. The opportunity for such an abuse,
may be the fault of the Constitution calling for amendmt." 5 James
Madison noted that Charles Pinckney "doubted the propriety or necessity
54 1 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 121 (2d ed. 1934)
[hereinafter cited as Farrand].

55 Id. at 203.
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for it";"' but Elbridge Gerry added his support by saying that: "[T]he
novelty and difficulty of the experiment requires periodical revision. The
prospect of such a revision would also give intermediate stability to the
Govt."'5 7 The resolution was postponed by a vote of seven states to
three.58
Randolph's proposal for amending the Constitution without the consent of Congress was postponed on several occasions as the convention
proceeded to its work. 9 When, on June 12 and 13 the committee of the
whole recapitulated the resolutions after a week of revision, the proviso
had been stricken; it did not reappear.6 0 The committee, on the other
hand and in due course, inserted a clause requiring "the Approbation
of Congress" for the proposing of new amendments. 0 ' It was not until
August 30 that the alternative proposal for initiating amendments by
state action was advanced and adopted without debate.2 It was not
until September 15-the day of the final debate on the new organic
instrument-that Gouverneur Morris and Elbridge Gerry moved that
Congress should call a constitutional convention upon application of
two-thirds (nine, as Madison noted 8) of the states. 4 The Morris-Gerry
motion was thus incorporated into present article V. With the twenty-one
year moratorium on the question of legislation outlawing the slave trade,
and the assurance to the small states that their equal vote in the Senate
would be preserved, 5 article V as it now reads was approved.
From the records of the Convention of 1787 it is clear that the Founding Fathers were concerned, in article V, with two central problems: One
was the desire to reform the rigid procedure for "alteration" which had
been provided in the Articles of Confederation; the other was a doubt
as to whether the federal system which they were constructing would
actually work in practice. The need for overhauling state constitutions
hastily devised during the Revolution was familiar to many of the delegates to Philadelphia; by 1787 at least half of the original states had
taken, or were about to take, adtion to replace their first constitutions.
56 Id. at 121.
57 Id. at 122.
58 Ibid.
59
60

Id.
Id.

at 194, 203.
at 223, 227, 231, 237.

61 2 Farrand 133.
62 Id. at 467-68.

63 Id. at 148.
64 Id. at 629-30 (general discussion)
65 Id. at 631.
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New Hampshire had made three attempts to draft an acceptable document before its constitution was finally adopted in 1784; Massachusetts
had had a comparable experience in the lengthy debates of its constitutional convention. Before the end of the eighteenth century, Delaware
and Pennsylvania had each adopted two constitutions, while Georgia,
South Carolina and Vermont had adopted three apiece.6
For that matter, the fact that a second national charter was now being
drafted only six years after the final ratification of the first one, made
many besides Elbridge Gerry feel that "the novelty and difficulty of the
experiment" would necessitate frequent revision.6 7 Edmund Randolph,
fearing the "indefinite and dangerous power given by the Constitution
to Congress," moved "that amendments to the plan might be offered by
the State Conventions, which should be submitted to and finally decided
on by another General Convention." 68 Charles Pinckney, while having
grave reservations, observed that "conventions are serious things, and
ought not to be repeated."6 9 The Randolph motion was defeated by
unanimous vote. 70
Article 13 of the Articles of Confederation had provided that "alterations" in the Articles were to be approved by the Continental Congress
and then unanimously confirmed by the states. Alexander Hamilton
reminded the convention that it "had been wished by many and was much
to have been desired that an easier mode of introducing amendments had
been provided." 17 ' But Hamilton rejected the idea that the states should
have either joint or exclusive rights to propose amendments: "The State
Legislatures will not apply for alterations but with a view to increase
their own powers-The National Legislature will be the first to perceive
and will be most sensible to the necessity of amendments. 72
The convention proviso in article V, as the internal evidence of the
convention and ratification debates strongly suggests, was never considered as anything but a transitional safeguard. Randolph, in his notes
66 Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolution, chs. 4 & 5 (1927);
1 Thorpe, The Federal & State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws
of the States, Territories and Colonies, 1492-1908, at 562, 568 (1909) [hereinafter cited
as Thorpe]; 2 Thorpe 777, 785, 791; 5 Thorpe 3081, 3092; 6 Thorpe 3241, 3248, 3258,
3737, 3747, 3762.
67 1 Farrand 121-22.
68 2 Farrand 631.
69 Id. at 632.
70 Id. at 633.
71 Id. at 558.
72 Ibid.
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refers to "two-thirds" of the states as "nine"--4.e., in terms of the thirteen
members of the "perpetual union" proclaimed by the Articles, now being
made "more perfect" under the new instrument." Hamilton, writing
after the fact of ratification but in refutation of New York's abortive
effort to seek a new convention, observed: "The intrinsic difficulty of
governing THIRTEEN STATES . . . will, in my opinion, constantly
impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation
to the reasonable expectations of their constituents. '74 Somewhat ruefully, Hamilton conceded, "we may safely rely on the disposition of the
state legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the
national authority. ' 75 But to demand a new convention, Hamilton insisted,
would be to deny to the new Constitution the practical tests of time and
experience which alone would determine if it was workable.7" The thrust
of all the writing concerning the convention proviso would seem to be
that once the constitutional system was demonstrably operative, the
proviso itself would become inoperative since its only function was to
provide a means of correcting the system if it failed to become self77
sustaining.
At the very least, the historical evidence demonstrates the totally different intent of the current proposal to amend article V by resort to the
general convention device. In the first place, the proposal of the General
Assembly of the States seeks to utilize that quite possibly inoperative
device to alter the article in such degree as to reduce the national government to a confederation subject to state legislative control-and in the
very process to eliminate the convention device once its purposes had been
served." The proposed amendment would, in fact, strike both convention
73
74
75

Id. at 148.
The Federalist No. 85, at 593 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton).

Ibid.

76 Id. at 594-95.
77 Cf. Elbridge Gerry in the House of Representatives in 1789:
The Constitution of the United States was proposed by a Convention met at Philadelphia; but . . . that Convention was not convened in consequence of any express
will of the people, but an implied one, through their members in the state legislatures. The Constitution derived no authority from the first Convention; it was concurred in by conventions of the people, and that concurrence armed it with power,
and invested it with dignity.
4 Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 404 (2d ed. 1836). See generally Orfield, Amending the Federal Constitution,
ch. 6 (1942).
78

Action on Resolutions of the Sixteenth Biennial General Assembly of the States,

36 State Gov't 24 (1963).
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procedures presently incorporated in the article-the first being the
general convention proviso inserted at the last minute by the MorrisGerry motion79 and the second being the alternative method which Congress may stipulate for state ratification of proposed amendments." It
is pertinent here to recall the observation made by Madison at the 1787
Convention, in reference to the proposal in article VII to require ratification of the Constitution by conventions rather than by legislatures."'
Madison pointed out that
the powers given to the Genl. Govt. being taken from the State Govts. the
Legislatures would be more disinclined than conventions composed in part at
devise modes, apparently proleast of other men; and if disinclined, they 8could
2
moting, but really thwarting the ratification.

Subsequently, writing in support of adoption of the Constitution,
Madison speculated:
If . . . the people should in future become more partial to the fcederal than
to the State governments, the change can only result, from such manifest and
irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded
from giving3 most of their confidence where they may consider it to be most
due ....

8

The preamble confirms what is manifest in every part of the record of
the convention and the adoption-that the Constitution emanated from
the people and was not the act of sovereign and independent states.8 , If
the people of the United States-the amalgam of the people of the thirteen
original states and of the subsequently created states-ordained and
established this Constitution, the states and their legislatures cannot be
2 Farrand 629-30.
80 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374 (1921).
81 It is worth noting in passing that another resolution submitted by Edmund Randolph
proposed ratification of the "amendment" of the Articles of Confederation (the presumed
business of the 1787 convention) by conventions of the people of the several states. James
(later Mr. Justice) Wilson commented concerning this resolution that "the people by a
convention are the only power that can ratify the proposed system of the new government."
1 Farrand 126-27. The concept of "the people of the United States" was already taking
shape.
70

82 2 Farrand 476.

83 The Federalist No. 46, at 317 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Madison).
84 "The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by the
states in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution
declares, by the people of the United States." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 324 (1816) (Story, J.); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403
(1819) (Marshall, C. J.).
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proper parties at interest in any amending proposal having the effect, as
threatened by proposed article V, of abridging a right of the very people
who created the Constitution.
On yet another count the present proposal concerning article V is
indictable as capricious and subversive of the entire constitutional system.
It is that in the majority of states the state constitution is subject to
revision or at least approval of revision by the people, either by election
or convention.8 5 Even the conservative, Thomas M. Cooley, considering
the ultimate source of constitutional power, found it in the people and
not in their legislatures except as the people had so delegated it."' But
all revisions of the Constitution, Cooley maintained, must ultimately be
submitted to the people as a whole.87 It is clear that the resolution of the
case for the legitimacy and authority of a republican form of government
rests ultimately upon the people who constitute that government. In the one
case, these are the people of a state in the American form of federalism;
and in the other, they are the people of the United States. It is begging
the question to aver that the federal government is one of delegated and
limited powers; assuming this to be true, the powers are delegated and
limited by the people of the United States who ordained and established
the Constitution. An amending proposal going to the legitimacy of the
federal authority is the exclusive concern of the people upon whom such
legitimacy and authority rests; for the states or their legislatures to call
it in question is only to derogate their own legitimacy and authority.
THE AMENDING PROCESS IN PRACTICE: FEDERAL OR
STATE RESPONSIBILITY?

Time and experience-the basic Hamiltonian requisites for testing the
workability of the new Constitution-have demonstrated two basic features of article V in practice. One is that amendments have been kept to
a minimum; in the course of 175 years, only twenty-nine have been
submitted by Congress to the states, and of these only twenty-three have
been adopted. The other is that, with three early exceptions (the ninth,
tenth and eleventh, all adopted in the first decade of the Constitution),
85 Cf. constitutions of the following states: Alaska Const. art. XIII, § 1; Ariz. Const.
art. 21, § 1; Cal. Const. art. 18, § 1; Ga. Const. art. XIII, § 1; Idaho Const. art. 20, § 1;
Ind. Const. art. 16, § 1; Iowa Const. art. 10, § 1; Mass. Const. art. XLVIII, § 173; NJ.
Const. art. 9, § 1; N.Y. Const. art. 19, § 1; Pa. Const. art. 18, § 1; Tenn. Const. art. 11,
§ 3; Va. Const. art. XV, § 196.
86 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 81-90 (8th ed. Carrington 1927).
87 Id. at 88.
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the amendments have tended to strengthen the federal position and correspondingly to limit the states' participation in or exemption from national
concerns.
ConstitutionalAmendatory History
Since the first amendments were proposed by the first Congress, more
than three thousand proposals for amendment have been introduced in
subsequent Congresses, many of them via state legislative memorials."s
The first attempt to fix the amending process itself in a more rigid, statedominating form, was made in 1794 by Rhode Island, last of the original
states to ratify the Constitution. It proposed that no subsequent amendments be effective "without the consent of 11 of the States heretofore
united under the Confederation."8 19 Scores of other proposals for altering
article V-all of them understandably seeking the interest of the proposing agency-have been advanced since then. Most of them have sought
to relax the amending requirements-by reducing the majority needed to
propose or to ratify, by providing for a popular vote in ratification, or
by making possible the introduction of amendments by initiative.9 0 In
1911, Senator Bristow of Kansas anticipated the sense of the 1963 proposal by introducing a plan which would have provided that
whenever the Legislature of any State wishes the Constitution altered, it shall
pass a resolution embodying the proposed change or amendment and send a copy
to the Secretary of State, who shall without delay transmit a copy thereof to the
governor of every State with a request that it shall be brought to the State
legislature either at the next regular session or at a special session, as the governor may think advisable 1

The Bristow proposal reflected the zeal of the progressive political
movement, which had captured many of the states and had persuaded
them that the federal government was moving too slowly into the socio-

economic paths of the twentieth century 2 The opposite state persuasion
is reflected in the 1963 proposal; but both suffer from the same error of
constitutional theory-the assumption that the states or their legislatures
88 See Ames, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States During
the First Century of Its History, 2 American Historical Ass'n Report for 1896 (1897);
Musmanno, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, H.R. Doc. No. 551, 70th Cong.,

2d Sess. (1929).
89 Musmanno, supra note 88, at 190; Ames, op. cit. supra note 88, at 292.
90 Musmanno, supra note 88, ch. V.
91 Id. at 191-92.

92 An excellent portrait of the Senate in the clash of reform and tradition appears in
Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era 313-66 (1932).
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have a right to determine the amending process and the subject-matter
of amendments to the federal constitution 3
As for the subject-matter of the amendments which have in fact been
submitted and adopted, they may be seen to fall into three broad categories-subject both to judicial interpretation and the changing political
frames of reference across the years. Of the twenty-one operative amendments (the twenty-first having repealed the eighteenth), thirteen may be
described as primarily intended to secure personal rights for the people
of the United States-the source of the federal power itself. Four amendments relate to the functions of the federal government. The remaining
four relate to the rights-or liabilities-of the states in the federal
system.
1. Amendments I-VIII (the Bill of Rights) concern certain civil,
criminal and political rights of the individual: freedom of expression, the
now dead-letter definitions of civilian-military relations, freedom from
unlawful search and seizure, self-jeopardy (the "fifth"), speedy jury trials
and reasonable bail 94 The thirteenth abolished slavery, the fifteenth enforced manhood suffrage and the nineteenth woman suffrage. The twentythird extended suffrage to residents of the District of Columbia. The
seventeenth-which was a substantial curtailment of state legislative
influence in national legislative affairs-also extended the people's voting
rights to the election of United States Senators.
2. Four amendments amplify or clarify functions of the national government-the twelfth and twentieth, relating to presidential electoral
procedures; the sixteenth, overcoming the income tax rule in Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.;"5 and the twenty-second, limiting incumbency in the presidency to two terms.
3. The remaining four amendments are the only ones primarily affecting the states in the federal system. The ninth is hardly more than a
policy statement, and pertains as much to the people of the United States
as to the people of the individual states; it has aptly been termed the
"forgotten" amendment 6-- and indeed there has been almost a total
93 Cf. Corwin's comment: "The one power known to the Constitution which clearly
is not limited by it is that which ordains it-in other words, the original, inalienable power
of the people of the United States to determine their own political institutions." Corwin,
The Constitution and What it Means Today 177 (12th ed. 1958).
94 See id. at 188-239.
95 157 U.S. 429, modified on rehearing, 158 U.S. 160 (1895).
96 Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment (1955). See also United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1947) (dictum).
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dearth of judicial commentary upon it. It might be termed a constitutional maxim in derogation of the common-law rule of expressio unius.
The tenth has had little more significance; indeed, the Supreme Court in
1931 went out of its way to declare that it "added nothing to the instrument as originally ratified."9 7 But the tenth amendment has provided the
point of departure, at least, for three lines of judicial argument: through
Marshall's tenure, in the direction of narrow construction of reserved
powers; 9 8 for the following century, in the opposite direction; 9 since
1937, in a new course emphasizing that certain assertions of federal
powers were not incursions into the tenth amendment area.'
The
eleventh was a swift and vigorous (at the time) assertion of state prerogative in overturning Chisholm v. Georgia.01' But outweighing all of
these in practical and jurisprudential effect has been the fourteenth.
Although its language purports to extend to the people of the states the
privileges guaranteed to them by the federal government under the fifth
amendment, voluminous judicial interpretation has made it the instrument by which state freedom of action or freedom from liability vis-h-vis
many national and interstate subject-areas has been progressively circumscribed in narrower dimensions. 0 2
The Strengthening of the FederalPosition
The first twelve amendments were adopted within the first generation
of the new Constitution. In the hundred years that followed only three
more were enacted. Then came four (on the income tax, popular election
of Senators, prohibition and woman suffrage) which reflected the high
tide of the progressive movement. The remainder have been responses to
particular needs of the political economy of the mid-twentieth century.
What is more significant, historically, is the fact that since adoption of
the eleventh amendment in 1795, the added constitutional provisions have
applied to the states only in a restrictive sense-witness the thirteenth,
fourteenth, fifteenth and seventeenth. Even more in point will be the
pending twenty-fourth amendment which would abolish the poll tax in
federal elections.
In 1920 the Supreme Court undertook to define the scope and purpose
United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931).
98 See Corwin 915-16.

97

99 See id. at 916-18.
100 See id. at 918.
101 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
102

See generally Corwin 957-1177.
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of article V by considering two series of cases, raised in reference to the
prohibition and woman suffrage amendments. One question presented to
the Court disputed the constitutional power of Congress to propose
amendments on matters which were claimed to be exclusively state concerns. The question, in the National Prohibition Cases,03 was settled
definitively in favor of the congressional power. The second contention, in
Dillon v. Gloss,10 4 was that Congress had acted arbitrarily in proposing
ratification by conventions rather than by action of the state legislatures.
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Vandevanter said:
An examination of Article V discloses that it is intended to invest Congress
with a wide range of power in proposing amendments.... Thus the people of the
United States, by whom the Constitution was ordained and established, have
made it a condition to amending that instrument that the amendment be submitted to representative assemblies in the several States and be ratified in threefourths of them. The plain meaning of this is (a) that all amendments must have
the sanction of the people of the United States, the original fountain of power,
acting through representative assemblies, and (b) that ratification by these
assemblies in three-fourths of the States shall be taken as a decisive expression
of the people's will and be binding on all.10 5

The state, in acting upon a proposed amendment to the federal constitution, has been held by the Supreme Court to be performing a federal
function derived from the Constitution itself; and this "transcends any
limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a state." 00 Nor is there
such a distinction, in the tenth amendment, between powers reserved to
the states and those reserved to the people, as to give the states a right of
qualifying their federal function in acting upon a proposed amendment
purportedly affecting their powers. 10 7 No conditions to discharging the
federal function may be imposed by a state in such cases.
Constitutional federalism in the United States is a product of the
national experience during the past 175 years; that the state-federal
relationship has changed as it has matured is simply a fact of history. In
1787 there were two forces which functioned in relationship to the
103 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
104 256 U.S. 368 (1921).

1o5 Id. at 373-74.
106 Lesser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); cf. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S.
716 (1931). Where a state legislature acts upon an amendment submitted to it by Congress,
it is exercising power conferred by the federal constitution and not by any provision in
its own state constitution. State ex rel. Tate v. Sevier, 333 Mo. 662, 667, 62 S.V.2d 895, 897

(1933).
107 See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229 (1920).
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creature of one of the forces. These were the people of the states and the
states themselves, on the one hand, and the Continental Congress-the
product of an interstate compact which, in Randolph's words, "cried
aloud for its own reform" 1°8-on the other. In 1789, and probably in 1788
when the Constitution was ratified, the American polity was comprised
of four forces-the people of the several states and the states themselves,
substantially as before; and in addition, the people of the United States
and the federal structure they had established. The process effectuated
in 1787-1788 was irreversible, as the Civil War was to establish. The competence of the states in national questions under the Confederation was
one thing; it was quite another under the Constitution.
In the light of these facts, it can reasonably be insisted that only a
federal agency (Congress, as provided by the Constitution) is competent
to evaluate and take action upon initiating proposals to be submitted to
the states, relating to the federal constitution. The only competence in
the states is that which is vested in them by the same Constitution, if the
general convention proviso of article V is in truth no longer of any effect.
Even if it were assumed to have continued in effect, the qualifications of
a state to participate in a constitutional question would depend upon the
standards enunciated by a federal judiciary-witness the criteria proposed by the opinion in Baker v. Carr."°
The ultimate question whether the general convention proviso in
article V is still viable today is obviously one to be determined by the
Supreme Court. There is then the question whether an alteration of article
V, by the general convention device or other means, is inconsistent with
the essence of federalism evolved in the course of 175 years. The answer
to this question is the responsibility of Congress itself, fixed by the oaths
of its members to uphold the Constitution. It is also the clear responsibility of Congress, if the general convention method were held valid and
if the propriety of such a proposal as the current one were conceded, to
prescribe the convention in terms of genuinely representative delegations
under the Baker rule. And, finally, it is within the reasonable discretion of Congress, in the event of such a convention, to stipulate unanimous approval of the results, in accordance with the action of ratification
of the original Articles of Confederation and with the final vote of the
qualified state delegations to the Convention of 1787.
108 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 423 (1793).
109 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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II
FEDERALISM AS REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

"Of course the mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political
right does not mean it presents a political question," Mr. Justice Brennan
observed in Baker v. Carr. 0 It is not necessary here to subject this
renowned case to an exhaustive critique-this has already been done;"'
but its basic propositions lead directly to the question of the degree to
which representative government is part of the essence of federalism
which, in the concept of the preceding section of this paper, is an exclusive concern of the people of the United States and their national government. It is on this ground that the second of the proposed amendments
of the General Assembly of the States must be condemned-and this
condemnation must rest upon the corpus of constitutional history as
much as upon the variable premises in Baker.
The language of the proposed amendment has a plausible ring-it seeks
to vest in the state legislatures the control of apportionment of membership in these legislatures." 2 And the language of the majority opinion in
Baker tends to encourage the advocates of this proposition, by emphasizing that the justiciability of malapportionment issues turns upon the
combination of irrationality of the local law and unavailability of local
remedy." 3 But the flaw in the one instance is not unlike the inherent difficulty in proposed article V; namely, that the control sought by the proposed apportionment amendment would be vested in the legislatures and
hence beyond the reach of the people. And the flaw in the second instance
is that the majority opinion in Baker has accepted, all too uncritically,
the strained and special rule laid down by Chief Justice Taney, and followed equally uncritically by later courts, as to what constitutes "political" questions beyond the judicial purview." 4
THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE: ESSENCE AND ORIGIN

The Court, this writer submits, must ultimately-in consequence of
the welter of rulings which have developed as a result of Baker" 511o Id. at 209.
111 Among the more successful efforts to place this holding in its proper context are: The
Problem of Malapportionment: A Symposium on Baker v. Carr, 72 Yale L.J. 7 (1962); and
the two issues devoted to the electoral process in 27 Law & Contemp. Prob. 157-327 (1962).
112 See Amending the Constitution to Strengthen the States in the Federal System, 36

State Gov't 13 (1963).
'13 369 U.S. 186, 198-204 (1962).
114 Cf. id. at 242 n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring).
115 E.g., Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1963); Valenti v. Dempsey, 211
F. Supp. 911 (D. Conn. 1962); Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Wash. 1962).
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reconsider the essence of the guarantee clause which it so quickly dismissed in that case. That clause was first introduced at the Convention
of 1787 by Edmund Randolph in the same series of resolutions on the
Virginia plan, to which reference has already been made." 6 The resolution "that a Republican government & the territory of each State . ..
ought to be guaranteed by the United States to each State" was accepted
by the convention virtually as axiomatic; the only concern expressed by
the delegates was that it might tend to perpetuate existing state constitu-7
tional processes which had outlived their value or called for reform."
James Wilson proposed a revision of the resolution which appears substantially as the present clause, and this virtually closed debate on the
matter." 8 The clause, now section 4 of article IV of the Constitution,
thus provides:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic Violence.
The wording of the clause is significant in several respects. First, as to
the general intent of the provision, the convention's committee on detail
advised that it was "(1) to prevent establishment of any government,
not republican (2) [31 to protect each state against internal commotion
and (3) [2] against external invasion.""' 9 The Founding Fathers were,
from the record of the convention debates, particularly concerned with
the latter two subjects;' 20 but enough had been said about the first subject to make it clear that they viewed anti-republicanism as equally basic
an evil to be combatted. 2' Domestic violence was a subject fresh in the
116 1 Farrand 20-23.
117 2 Farrand 47-49. One of the few, and certainly the most comprehensive, studies of
this clause is Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 513 (1962). The present writer, while working independently in the same source material, wishes to acknowledge the corroborating research
on this subject to be found in the Bonfield article. Professor Bonfield has extended his
observations in Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican
Government, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 245 (1962).
118 2 Farrand 48-49.

119 Id. at 148.

See 4 Farrand 122 (2d ed. 1937) for citations regarding these debates.
Cf. the objection to Randolph's resolution voiced by William Houston of Georgia:
he was "afraid of perpetuating the existing Constitutions of the States. That of Georgia
was a very bad one, and he hoped would be revised & amended." 2 Farrand 48. See note
128 infra.
120
121
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delegates' memories. Shays' rebellion in Massachusetts had taken place
the previous winter.2 2 Disputes between Connecticut settlers and the
Pennsylvania government over the settlers' claims in Pennsylvania's
Wyoming valley had flared sporadically between 1782 and 1787.123
124
Externally, Spanish threats in Florida loomed large in Georgia's eyes,
and the British power on the Great Lakes continued to worry the northern
states.123 It is readily understandable, therefore, that dangers of internal
and external force should be a subject which the convention wished to
make a national one. But by this very fact, the initial provision in the
clause for the protection of "a Republican Form of Government" assumes
an equal importance as a responsibility of the national authority.
Second, then, is the significance of the reference to this national authority--"the United States shall guarantee" this republican form of
government. The guarantee is not the exclusive concern of Congress,
whose powers are set out in article I; nor of the executive, whose powers
are set out in article II; nor of the judiciary, whose powers are set out
in article III. Article IV, in which this guarantee appears, concerns the
relations of the states to each other and to the national government in
the federal system. Section 1 contains the "full faith and credit" clause
and empowers Congress to implement it; section 2 prescribes the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states and has derived its
force throughout the national history from Supreme Court interpretation;126 section 3 concerns the admission of new states and vests the
authority to admit them in the Congress, as well as vesting in Congress
a general authority over territories. But section 4 is a general power
vested in the national government-which of necessity and logic means
in any and all branches of that government established by the Constitution.
GUARANTEE CLAUSE AS INTERPRETED-AN EXCLUSIVELY

"POLITICAL"

CONCERN?

If the intention of the guarantee is that a republican form of government is to be a constitutional concern of the federal government, it
is clearly not a "political" question but a legal one. It may not be exclusively judicial but under the language of the clause, it may also
122 Warren, The Making of the Constitution 30-32 (1928).
123 6 Avery, A History of the United States and its People 387-89 (1909).
124 1 Morison & Commager, The Growth of the American Republic 270 (1942).
125 See Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States 70, 73 (4th ed. 1995).
126

Corwin 686-92.
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be legislative and/or executive. That it should have come to be held
to be "political" is an unfortunate result of Chief Justice Taney's opinion
in the old case of Luther v. Borden'27-- and a misreading of that opinion
as well. The case arose in Rhode Island and developed from Dorr's
rebellion in 1841-1842; i.e., from the type of "domestic violence" to which
28
reference is made in the third proviso of section 4 of article IV.'
The state's fundamental charter, as a matter of fact, was its colonial
charter of 1663 which it did not replace with a new constitution until
1843.120 In 1841 a group of state residents, disfranchised under the
ancient charter, took the initiative in organizing a constitutional convention, which in turn adopted a new constitution and elected Thomas
W. Dorr as the governor. An abortive attempt was made to carry the
constitution into effect by force, but the rebellion was quickly frustrated.
In the case which came before the Taney court, one Martin Luther, a
supporter of Dorr and a participant in the rebellion, sought to maintain
an action in trespass against Luther Borden and others who, relying
upon the authority of the incumbent "charter government," had broken
into Luther's house to arrest him. The plaintiff insisted that the people
of the state of Rhode Island had by sovereign action replaced the
old charter, and hence that Borden and his associates were without
lawful authority to come upon his property.8 0 The question therefore
presented to the Court was, as the Chief Justice stated it, whether any
legality obtained for acts done under the constitution adopted by
the popular convention in 1842 or whether the constitution of 1843,
sanctioned by the "charter government," was the proper terminal date
for the latter government.'
This, clearly, was not the same as a
question whether the United States was being required to guarantee to
Rhode Island a republican form of government; the plaintiffs either
neglected, or were unable, to raise a constitutional question in such a
form as would have focused the Court's attention upon the guarantee
question. Thus, Taney was confined (or confined himself) to the
127 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); cf. Bonfield, The Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 513, 533 (1962).
128 It is worth remembering that Gouverneur Morris objected to the original proposal

of the guarantee in the Convention of 1787 by stating that he did not wish to guarantee
Rhode Island's constitution. 2 Farrand 47. And Rhode Island, it will be recalled, did not
participate in the Convention.
129 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 35.
180 Id. at 35-37.
181 See id. at 46.
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question of legitimacy under the circumstances of the constitutional
upheaval of this whole period in Rhode Island. And he found the Court
estopped from assuming the function vested in the United States under
section 4 of article IV because another federal agency-the executivehad already elected to settle the question acting under authority conferred upon that agency by Congress. 1 32 Taney's opinion, however,
requires some attention, since it was the progenitor of a succession of
opinions tending to establish the concept of the "political" question:
But the courts uniformly held that the inquiry proposed to be made belonged
to the political power and not to the judicial; that it rested with the political
power to decide whether the charter government had been displaced or not: and
when that decision was made, the judicial department would be bound to take
notice of it as the paramount law of the State ...

that, according to the law

and institutions of Rhode Island, no such change had been recognized by the
political power; and that the charter government was the lawful and established
government of the State during the period in contest, and that those who were in
arms against it were insurgents, and liable to punishment....
Upon what ground could the Circuit Court of the United States which tried
this case have departed from this rule, and disregarded and overruled the decisions of the courts of Rhode Island? Undoubtedly the courts of the United States
have certain powers under the Constitution and laws of the United States which
do not belong to the State courts. But the power of determining that a state
government has been lawfully established, which the courts of the State disown
and repudiate, is not one of them. Upon such a question the courts of the
United States are bound to follow the decisions of the State tribunals, and
must therefore regard the charter government as the lawful and established
government during the time of this contest ...
Moreover, the Constitution of the United States, as far as it has provided
for an emergency of this kind, and authorized the general government to
interfere in the domestic concerns of a State, has treated the subject as political
in its nature, and placed the power in the hands of that department.
The fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United
States provides that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the
Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against
invasion; and on the application of the legislature or of the executive (when
the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.
Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what
government is the established one in a State. For as the United States
guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily
132 Id. at 43. The statute is quoted in the opinion in its original form. In its modern
form it appears in 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1958), and provides, in event of domestic disturbance

in a particular state, for calling into federal service such of the militia of other states, in
the number requested by that state, and using such of the armed forces, as he (the President)
considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.
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decide what government is established in the State before it can determine
whether it is republican or not. And when the senators and representatives
of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the
government under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character,
is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding
on every other department of the government, and could not be questioned
in a judicial tribunal....
So, too, as relates to the clause in the above mentioned article of the Constitution, providing for cases of domestic violence. It rested with Congress,
too, to determine upon the means proper to be adopted to fulfill this guarantee.
They might, if they had deemed it most advisable to do so, have placed it
in the power of a court to decide when the contingency had happened which
required the federal government to interfere. But Congress thought otherwise,
and no doubt wisely; and by the act of February 28, 1795, provided, that, "in
case of an insurrection in any State against the government thereof, it shall be
lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the legislature
of such State or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened),
to call forth such number of the militia of any other State or States, as may be
applied for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such insurrection.
By this act, the power of deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon which
the government of the United States is bound to interfere, is given to the
President. He is to act upon the application of the legislature or of the
executive, and consequently he must determine what body of men constitute
the legislature, and who is the governor, before he can act ...
The interference of the President, therefore, by announcing his determination, was as effectual as if the militia had been assembled under his orders.
And it shpuld be equally authoritative. For certainly no court of the United
States, with a knowledge of this decision, would have been justified in recognizing the opposing party as the lawful government; or in treating as wrongPresident had
doers or insurgents the officers of the government which the
133
recognized, and was prepared to support by an armed force.
Relying upon Taney's opinion, including his dictum, the majority
opinion in Baker concluded that Luther had established "that the

Guaranty Clause is not a repository of judicially manageable standards
which a court could utilize independently in order to identify a State's

lawful government."'

34

This conclusion was not necessarily a valid one

since the question in Baker was not whether the governmental process
involving malapportionment was lawful (in the sense of being legitimate
and not insurrectionary) but whether it was republican. Thus, Luther
could only be concerned with the proviso in article IV, section 4, relating
to domestic violence. Confined to this narrow issue, the Taney holding
133

48 U.S. (7 How.) at 39, 40, 42-44.

134 369 U.S. at 223; cf. id. at 292-97 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting and analyzing Luther).
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is a proper precedent. The point in reviewing at such length the role
of Luther with respect to the guarantee proviso is to underline the proposition that that case is not applicable to the guarantee of a republican form
of government. The proposition that judicially manageable standards
are not available with regard to the republican form of government
proviso, then, may only mean that courts have been reluctant to enter
this area, but it does not mean that it may not be a legal question.
Taney's statement that the language of article IV, section 4, "has
treated the subject as political in its nature," and that "Congress must
necessarily decide what government is established in the State before
it can determine whether it is republican,"' 135 is gratuitous as well as
dictum. Article IV vests certain specific responsibilities in Congress in
sections 1 and 3; the mention of Congress in these clauses merely underlines the significance of the lack of such mention in section 4. It is
obvious that Congress is concerned with the application of the guarantee
clause, and as a practical matter, legislative action may be the most
practical means of implementing the clause. But such action is properly
limited to particular subjects within the area of responsibility envisioned by the clause; the act of 1795, to which the Taney opinion
refers, is addressed only to the specific issue of domestic violence.
Therefore, until Congress acts, in like manner, with regard to the
republican form of government proviso, that subject matter may still
be thought of as being a legal issue open even to the federal judiciary. 13
Surely, as was pointed out earlier, the language of the guarantee clause
does not support the conclusion that all determinations thereunder are
within the exclusive province of Congress-especially not the determination of what violates the republican form of government proviso. In
any event, the guarantee clause is an example of federal power, be it
judicial, congressional or executive, over the states in the areas specified
in article IV.
The Court in Baker, having persuaded itself that the guarantee clause
was exclusively "political," failed to spell out the complete federal
authority under that clause and based its opinion on the provisions of
335 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.

136 The present writer contends, as is evident from his treatment of the Luther case and
the subsequent reliance upon it, that the term "political" is properly applicable only to those
functions of the legislature which consist essentially of a choice of alternative courses in
terms of policy (or party) preferences, and that this legislative function is distinguishable
from the legal; i.e., lawmaking or statute-enacting function in discharge of constitutional
obligations.
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the fourteenth amendment which it deemed applicable. 18 7 As is suggested
below, this amendment may actually be considered as complementing
the responsibilities settled upon the states and the federal government
by article IV, section 4. This depends upon a proper re-examination
-of Luther in terms of the foregoing review. But that the draftsmen
of the proposed amendment now advocated by the General Assembly
of the States have not overlooked the latent federal power in the
guarantee clause is clear in its wording: "No provision of this Constitution [i.e., article IV, section 4] or any amendment thereto [i.e., the
fourteenth] shall restrict or limit any state"'3 8 in the matter of legislative
apportionment. The complementary section of the proposal would remove
from the judiciary the authority to entertain any suit at law or equity
on questions of apportionment. 9
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN JEOPARDY

The current proposal, then, challenges the federal concept of our
governmental structure at three points. In the first place, it recognizes,
if the Court as yet does not, the true breadth of the federal authority
vested in article IV, section 4. Secondly, it concedes, by specific
reference, that this authority may extend to the judicial as well as to the
legislative and executive branches of the federal government. But thirdly
in sum, it is intended to excise from American federalism the concept
of representative government. If representative government is the
essence of federalism-as this discussion has assumed and as is examined
below-then the proposed amendment must be indicted as subversive of
the entire constitutional structure.
That representative government is the essence of federalism is readily
discerned in the specific provisions of the Constitution itself. Indeed,
our history demonstrates that representation in terms of a broadened
suffrage has become more fundamental a requirement of federalism
with the passing of time. Thus, manhood suffrage became universal
in 1870;140 it was extended to women in 1920; '4' and, it was extended in

1961 to the residents of the District of Columbia with reference to
presidential elections.'4 The present policy of the United States, to
137 369 U.S. at 237.
138 See Amending the Constitution, supra note 112, at 14.
139 Ibid.
140 U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.
141 U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
142

U.S. Const. amend. XXII.
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minimize or eliminate any restraints upon the exercise of suffrage, is
reflected in the imminent ratification of the twenty-fourth amendment
which would outlaw a poll tax in federal elections. And as the celebrated
case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot 4 3 has demonstrated, in a holding which
may well be regarded as a corollary of Baker, impediments to the
exercise of suffrage which may be struck down by the courts under
the fourteenth amendment include any which unreasonably tend to reduce
the effectiveness of the exercise by preventing the equal impact of
the vote upon the electoral system.
While it is true that the provision of article I, section 5, that "Each
House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications
of its own Members" has encouraged Congress under the guise of
professional courtesy to overlook circumstances which frustrate the
representative process,' 44 this does not diminish the validity of the proposition that the intent of the Constitution as a whole-with article IV,
section 4, read in the context of the fourteenth, fifteenth, twentieth
and twenty-third amendments-is to assert representation as the essence
of federalism. For, if the suffrage guarantees are to be of practical
effect, the exercise of the suffrage must reasonably have equal effect for
all voters. Thus said Mr. Justice Brennan:
These appellants seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of their
own, and of those similarly situated. Their constitutional claim is, in substance,
that the 1901 [Tennessee] statute constitutes arbitrary and capricious state
action, offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment in its irrational disregard of the
standard of apportionment prescribed by the State's Constitution or of any
standard, effecting a gross disproportion of representation to voting population.
The injury which appellants assert is that this classification disfavors the voters
in the counties in which they reside, placing them in a position of constitutionally
unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis voters in irrationally favored counties. A citizen's right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution .... 145

The circumstances under which the Convention of 1787 accepted
the provision which became article IV, section 4-with a question only
as to its possible delimiting of the federal power vis-h-vis unregenerate
state constitutionalism' 46--established the principle that a republican
form of government was an enforceable requirement of membership
in the federal union. Whether "republican" equates with representative
364 U.S. 339 (1961).
144 Corwin 95-96.
'145 369 U.S. at 207-08.
143

146

See note 117 supra and accompanying text.
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government, and whether this in turn is synonymous with reasonable
degrees of equality of effect of the voter's exercise of his suffrage, has
presumably been established by the rules in Gomillion and in Baker.
This being so, the proposal of the General Assembly of the States is
inimical to the rationale of federalism.
The current proposal is an apt illustration of Hamilton's warning that
state legislatures would seek to alter the Constitution only with a view
to the increase of their own powers.147 But, in the context of the preceding
section of this discussion, the proposal must be condemned as an improper attempt on the part of the states to intrude upon the area of
action which the people of the United States have established as their
exclusive domain. These people may, of course, elect to accede to state
challenges of the exclusiveness or paramountcy of federal jurisdictionwitness the tidelands oil statute 4 8 or the Taft-Hartley Act.' 49 And
they may choose, wisely or unwisely, to limit their own governmental
powers-witness the twenty-second amendment. But in each case it is
the act of the people of the United States, not of the states or their legislatures. The present proposal, by which the states seek to withdraw from
the people of the United States control over an obligation which the
people made a condition of state competence within the federal system,
can come legitimately only from the party which established the condition
originally.
III
COURT OF THE UNIoN-AN INVITATION TO CHAOS

The most frivolous of all the proposals here being reviewed, and the
one which most clearly reveals the objective of subjugating the federal
system to state control, is the one seeking to establish a so-called Court of
the Union. Merely to describe a fifty-judge court, or even one with thirtyseven judges on its bench if a three-fourths majority for a quorum is
involved, is ludicrous enough. To propose that such a court be an extraordinary agency within the federal system 5 0 would reduce federal
judicial processes and administrations to a shambles, not to mention
147 1 Farrand 558.
148 Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29 (1953), as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1958).
149 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-87 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87(a) (Supp. IV, 1963).
15o It would obviously be within the federal system since it would deal with federal
questions and, as proposed in one section of the draft amendment, would be financed by

Congress.
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what it would do to the business of the state courts.'5 1 Its greatest mischief, of course, is in the same error which characterizes the other two
proposals: that they seek, singly and collectively, to subvert the entire
system of federalism and to presume upon what are the exclusive
prerogatives of the people of the United States. The greater evil in
the present proposal is its assumption that the states should somehow
and for some reason have a particular degree of immunity from the
responsibilities of membership in the union.
The proposal for a Court of the Union would do violence to the basic
framework upon which the three major branches of national government
were devised in the Constitution, as well as to the mature system of
operation which has grown from 175 years of experience. It would first
of all, unsettle the organization of the judiciary as set forth in the first
section of article III: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." It would further,
as would the second section of the proposed malapportionment amendment, delimit section 2 of article III by introducing a negative proviso
into the statement of jurisdiction. 152 Finally, it would contradict the
logical and well-proved process, provided in article II, section 2, for
appointment of judicial officers of the United States by the President,
by and with the consent of the Senate.
Debate at the Constitutional Convention bore directly upon decisionmaking at the stage of last resort-the power of the Supreme Court over
state actions affecting the federal constitution. It was the ultimate stage
of an orderly and balanced federal system; if the Court of the Union
proposal were accepted, it would tip that balance in the direction of
inconsistency and chaos. As will be seen in the next succeeding paragraphs, the convention proceedings lay bare, in three separate series
of discussions, progressively logical reasons why a supreme tribunal
should be established. First, that as a general proposition, there should
be some body to pronounce legislative acts void; that body was the
judiciary. Second, that either the Congress or the federal judiciary should
have the power to negative state legislative acts; a proposal so to
empower the Congress was defeated. And finally, that only a single
supreme tribunal could settle with sufficient finality and consistency, the
issues arising from the several and diverse state jurisdictions.
151 See Chandler, McConnell, & Tolman, Administering the Courts: Federal, State and
Local, 42 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 13 (1958).
152 Cf. Corwin 543-44, 554-55, 578-82, 592-610.
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That review of all acts of the federal and state governments which
raised a question of federal constitutionality would be a responsibility of
the federal judiciary was assumed by Hamilton, who argued in support
of article III:
Some perplexity respecting the right of the courts to pronounce legislative
acts void, because contrary to the constitution, has arisen from an imagination
that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the leislative
power. It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another void,
must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. As
this doctrine is of great importance in all the American constitutions, a brief
discussion of the grounds on which it rests cannot be unacceptable.
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act
of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it
is exercised, is void. No legislative act therefore contrary to the constitution can
be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his
principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the'
people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers
may do not only what their powers do not authorise, but what they forbid.
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges
of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive
upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural
presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the
constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed that the constitution could intend
to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their
constituents. It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to
be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen
to be an irreconcileable variance between the two, that which has the superior
obligation and validity ought of course to be preferred; or in other words, the
to the statute, the intention of the people to
constitution ought to be preferred
153
the intention of their agents.

Perhaps the most significant discussion of the ultimate nature of the
federal judicial power took place at the Convention of 1787 in connection
with the debate on the powers of Congress. The proposal which precipitated the discussion was that Congress should have the following
right: "To negative all laws passed by the several States contravening in
the opinion of the Nat: Legislature the articles of Union, or any treaties
153 The Federalist No. 78, at 524-26 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
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Madison favored this

The necessity of a general Govt. proceeds from the propensity of the States to
pursue their particular interests in opposition to the general interest. . . .They
can pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects before they can be
repealed by the Genl Legislre or be set aside by the National Tribunals.1 5

But Gouverneur Morris opposed vesting the power in Congress stating
that a law which ought to be repealed "will be set aside in the Judiciary
department and if that security should fail; [it] may be repealed by a
National Law."'-5 There being no contradiction of this observation, the
proposed congressional review power was voted down by the Convention,
57
seven states to three.1

To the Founding Fathers, it seemed obvious that a single supreme
tribunal was required to settle the issues raised from such a diversity of
jurisdictions as even thirteen states presented. The principle was very
simply stated by Hamilton:
A circumstance, which crowns the defects of the confederation, remains yet to
be mentioned-the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter without
courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. The treaties of
the United States to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law
of the land. Their true import as far as respects individuals, must, like all other
laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these
determinations, they ought to be submitted in the last resort, to one SUPREME
TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority
which forms the treaties themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable.
If there is in each State, a court of final jurisdiction, there may be as many different final determinations on the same point, as there are courts. To avoid the
confusion which would unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a
number of independent judiciaries, all nations have found it necessary to establish
one court, paramount to the rest-possessing a general superintendance, and
authorized to settle and declare in the last resort, an uniform rule of civil justice.
This is more necessary where the frame of the government is so compounded,
that the laws of the whole are in danger of being contravened by the laws of the
parts. In this case if the particular tribunals are invested with a right of ultimate
jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be expected from difference of opinion,
there will be much to fear from the bias of local views and prejudices, and from
the interference of local regulations. As often as such an interference was to
happen, there would be reason to apprehend, that the provisions of the particular
laws might be preferred to those of the general laws; for nothing is more natural

Farrand 27.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

154 2
'55

156 Id. at 28. (Emphasis added.)
'57

Ibid.
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to men in office, than to look with peculiar
deference towards that authority to
158

which they owe their official existence.

One hundred and seventy-five years later, there is little to add to
Hamilton's statement.
The renowned Judiciary Act of 1789, drafted by the first Congress in
implementation of, and within recent memory of, the intentions of the
supremacy concept in article III, section 2, stipulated that in the case of
final judgment in a state court,
where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised
under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution...
[the judgment] may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme
Court of the United States upon a writ of error. 159

Such issues are validly presented to the Supreme Court, said John
Marshall, "whenever its correct decision depends upon the construction
of [the Constitution]..

,,16o The thread of jurisprudence from Marbury

v. Madison 6 ' to the present has been unbroken, and is too well established
in constitutional history to require repeating here.
Thus, diversity of state opinion having been resolved in favor of the
establishment of a supreme tribunal, and the authority of the Supreme
Court continually being implemented, it remained for the proponents
of the Court of the Union to concoct this confederating example of state
arbitration over federal constitutional questions. With specific reference
to all of the proposed amendments, state courts are probably even less
competent than state legislatures to participate in a process of federal
government. The sole competence of any state court, on a constitutional
question, lies in adjudicating the issue in terms of its own jurisprudence.
If-as the Constitution, the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the overwhelming
weight of judicial doctrine 62 throughout our history has set out-the
question then requires adjudication in terms of the federal constitution,
it goes beyond the area of state court competence. The proposal for
a so-called Court of the Union is in the highest degree irrational; either
its intention is to give all the state courts of last resort a right to review
the question on which one state court had the sole competence in terms
The Federalist No. 22, at 143-44 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
159 1 Stat. 85 (1789). The current provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958) is more comprehensive in scope.
160Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821).
158

101 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
162 Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.

64 (1938), an opinion which, of course, substantially expanded the influence of state common law in federal litigation.
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of its own jurisprudence, or it is intended to give these fifty courts a
collective right of review of certain federal decisions which can really
vest their competence only in one supreme federal court. The proposed
amendment flouts the fundamental concept of any government under
law, and a concept which the states regard as fundamental in their own
constitutional systems-that the ultimate determination of the validity
of any government function within that system is to be made by the
highest court within that system. After that determination, when the
only remaining question is one of validity within the federal system,
the United States Supreme Court alone can properly make such a
determination.
To pursue this matter further would only serve to belabor it. The
proposal, which would destroy the basic operating principle of American
federalism that the ultimate determination of federal constitutional
questions rests with the Supreme Court of the United States, would,
16 3
indeed, lead to chaos.
CONCLUSION

Surely, the inherent dangers of these three proposed amendments
are brought to the fore just as much when they are considered as a
package as when they were considered individually in the light of constitutional history. Whatever the merits of the arguments based on the
non-use of the convention proviso, the "political thicket" of reapportionment cases, and the ever changing and ever changeable Supreme Court,
the manner in which these proposed amendments collectively seek to
remedy ascendant federalism is alarmingly regressive. The interests of
the "people of the United States" would be subjected to the still
prevalent parochial interests of fifty diverse state sovereignties.
The road to chaos, or the whirlwind to be reaped, has not been
brought across the path of the American people with such determination
as this since the Civil War. That event of a century ago, indeed, settled,
by force of circumstances as much as by force of arms, the fundamental
positions of the states and the federal government in the federal system.
The matter was settled at that time by a variety of determinantseconomic, political and social as well as military-but all pointing
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Cf. Report of the Conference of Chief Justices 4 (1958), and Mr. Justice Holmes'

view: "I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to
declare an act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not
make that declaration as to the laws of the several States." Holmes, Collected Legal Papers
295-96 (1920).

19631

CONFEDERATING PROPOSALS

ultimately to the proposition that a nation of such size and diversity
could not function effectively except as a unit, or a union; and if a union,
then subject to the ultimate assumption of power in matters of national
concern by the national government. The issue of the sixties of the last
century, as one student of constitutional law has put it, was the choice
between the jurisprudence of Marshall, which took the supremacy clause
as its keynote, and that of Taney, which took the tenth amendment. 10 4
Or, as the same scholar restates it, the choice was between a competitive
concept of federalism and a cooperative concept. 16 5 If the settled
principle of the cooperative concept has developed in the past generation
as the prevailing one, it is because the competitive issue has been resolved
finally in favor of the national entity. The Supreme Court itself expressed
the proposition in 1913 as follows:
Our dual form of government has its perplexities, State and Nation having
different spheres of jurisdiction... but it must be kept in mind that we are one
people; and the powers reserved to the State and those conferred on the Nation
are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote
the general welfare, material and moral. 166

The fact is, as respects the federal power, that it is a power defined
in part by the original concept of the Convention of 1787 and of the
Congresses which have drafted the various amendments which have been
added to the Constitution; and in part by the experience and perspectives
reflecting the changes in American society over 175 years. But in all
instances, federal questions have been the proper and ultimately the
exclusive concern of the federal government-whether it be the legislative, executive or judicial branch. And federal questions include any
and all questions which involve the position of the states in the federal
system, or the compatibility of state policies with federal policies
which they affect. This cannot be otherwise-and it is not a matter of
competition or cooperation; for, from the outset the nature of the system
proposed by the Constitution has been fundamentally different from
that obtaining under the Articles of Confederation.
Consider the fundamental difference between the two constitutions:
the one being articles unanimously agreed to by the thirteen states and
the other being an instrument drafted by the people of the United States.
Article 2 under the Articles of Confederation clearly stated: "Every
164 Corwin xii.
165 Id. at xiv.

166 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913).
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State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." Article 3 described
the intention of the Confederation: "The said States hereby severally
enter into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common
defense, the security of their liberties and their mutual and general
welfare." The sense of article 3 is the sense of the preamble of the
Constitution; figuratively, if not literally, it could be urged that in the
preamble the people of the United States themselves announced this
undertaking to attain the goals which the states acting in a league of
friendship and commerce had been unable to reach. What is more
important, however, is that the assertiveness of state "sovereignty,
freedom and independence" in article 2 is not repeated
in the Constitu67
tion of 1787, but only appears in the tenth amendment.
Article 2 demonstrates the narrow intentions of the states in creating
a "perpetual union"--expressly delegating to the Continental Congress
concurrent or joint authority to discharge foreign relations and to wage
war (article 6),168 reserving control of the armed forces in the states
(article 7), and providing for the financing of the war and the other
national expenses from a "common treasury" to be maintained at
"the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several States"
(article 8). Coinage was to be made uniform by Congress-but it was
both a national and a state coinage; and Congress could regulate trade
with the Indian tribes "provided that the legislative right of any state
within its own limits be not infringed"; and in recess, the Congress was
to appoint an executive "Committee of the States" to discharge national
affairs (article 9). There were no executive powers; and as for judicial
powers, there were only two of the most limited nature, both set out
in article 9. Prize courts were to be set up to deal with capture of enemy
merchants during the war; while in the case of interstate disputes a
system which resembled a process of arbitration rather than adjudication was elaborately described. 6 9
To review the basic features of the Articles of Confederation is to
demonstrate the fundamental differences between the league of the states
and the federal union for which the people themselves ordained and
167 Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, ch. 7 (2d ed. 1948).
168 Cf. Carson, The Supreme Court of the United States: Its History, chs. 4 & 5 (1891).
(Appellate cases before the Continental Congress and the prize courts.)
169 Cf. id. ch. 6, on interstate disputes before Congress; also the renowned appendix of
unreported Supreme Court opinions and pre-constitutional cases in 131 U.S. (1889).
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established the Constitution. The details are familiar constitutional
history-although we appear to be courting conditions reminiscent of
Santayana's aphorism that those who ignore history must suffer the
penalty of repeating it. In the present context, it is worth pointing out
that by this Constitution, the people of the United States: (1) granted
much more definite and exclusive legislative powers to the national
government and vested them in Congress; (2) created a new body of
governmental powers-executive-and vested these powers in the President; and (3) established a distinct judicial power and vested it in
cone supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish." The Articles of Confederation
bound together thirteen sovereignties in certain limited areas of action;
the Constitution established a federal sovereignty which was paramount
to the state sovereignties in all matters which time and experience should
demonstrate to be of national concern. The Confederation failed of full
effectiveness precisely at these points where the Constitution provided
the essential national strength. The 1963 proposals of the General Assembly of the States would remove that essential strength and return
us to the limited capabilities of a Confederation.

